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Abstract: 
The paper investigates the role of global supply chains in explaining the trade collapse of 2008-2009 
and the long-term variations observed in trade elasticity. Building on the empirical results obtained 
from a subset of input-output matrices and the exploratory analysis of a large and diversified sample 
of countries, a formal model is specified to measure the respective short-term and long-term dynamics 
of trade elasticity. The model is then used to formally probe the role of vertical integration in 
explaining changes in trade elasticity. Aggregated results on long-term trade elasticity tend to support 
the hypothesis that world economy has undertaken in the late 1980s a "traverse" between two 
underlying economic models. During this transition, the expansion of international supply chains 
determined an apparent increase in trade elasticity. Two supply chains related effects (the composition 
and the bullwhip effects) explain also the overshooting of trade elasticity that occurred during the 
2008-2009 trade collapse. But vertical specialization is unable to explain the heterogeneity observed 
on a country and sectoral level, indicating that other contributive factors may also have been at work 
to explain the diversity of the observed results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The crisis that, after several months of gestation in the US financial sphere, irrupted into the 
international scene in September 2008 has been dubbed the "Great Trade Collapse" for its impact on 
international commerce. The shock, emanating from the largest world financial centre, spread very 
quickly and almost simultaneously to most industrial and emerging countries. The collapse of world 
trade has been unprecedented, even in comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). During the first quarter of 2009, world exports in value terms 
were 31 percent lower than one year before and world imports 30 percent lower. Also significant is 
the fact that freight rates for containers shipped from Asia to Europe have reached zero in the middle 
of January 2009 for the first time in history. 
 
International trade, which dropped five times more rapidly than global GDP, was both a casualty of 
the 2008-2009 crisis and one of its main channels of transmission. While a decrease in trade is 
expected when world output falls following a severe financial crisis, the magnitude of the collapse has 
surprised observers. This overreaction is reflected in high trade elasticities. Moreover, the trade 
collapse was not only sudden and severe, but also synchronized, which is another distinguishing 
feature of the current crisis. 
 
One prominent and often discussed new element in world production is the emergence of global 
supply chains. The recent phase of globalization, to be identified with the emblematic 1989 year, saw 
the emergence of new business models that built on new opportunities to develop comparative 
advantages (Krugman, 1995; Baldwin, 2006).1 With the opening of new markets, the technical 
revolution in IT and communications, and the closer harmonization of economic models worldwide, 
trade became much more than just a simple exchange of merchandise across borders. It developed 
into a constant flow of investment, of technologies and technicians, of goods for processing and 
business services, in what has been called the "Global Supply Chain".  
 
While providing renewed opportunities for increasing productivity and promoting industrialization in 
developing countries, the greater industrial interconnection of the global economy has created newer 
and faster channels for the propagation of adverse external shocks. Referring to the breakdown of 
2008-2009, some authors have pointed out that they may explain the abrupt decrease in trade or the 
synchronization of the trade collapse. The question is of importance for its economic and financial 
implications, but also for its social impact as the reorganization of global supply chains implies the 
destruction and creation of jobs at different locations.  
 
But has the impressive collapse in world trade really been caused by global supply chains? If the 
answer is yes, we should expect a deeper decrease of trade in those countries and sectors that 
participate in global production networks and a smoother reaction in those that produce mainly for the 
domestic market.  
 
Moreover, we should also expect that global supply chains play a role in the synchronization of the 
trade collapse and its size. One reason for this is the inherent magnification effect of global production 
networks: intermediate inputs cross the border several times before the final product is shipped to the 
final costumer. All the different production stages of the global supply chain rely on each other – as 
suppliers and as customers. Thus, if a shock occurs in one of the participating sectors or countries, the 
shock is transmitted quickly to the other stages of the supply chain through both backward and 
forward linkages. These transmission channels apply both to financial shocks, e.g. a credit crunch in 
                                                     
1 1989 is known for the fall of the Berlin Wall, which brought down the barriers that had split the post-
WWII world; it should also be reminded for the Brady Bonds, which put an end to the decade-long debt crisis 
that plagued many developing countries. In continuation, the 1990s saw the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and the birth of the WTO, which brought down many trade barriers and led to further liberalization in areas like 
telecommunications, financial services and information technologies. 
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one country, and to trade policy shocks, e.g. rising tariffs and non-tariff barriers, or implementing 
"buying local” campaigns.  
 
Another explanation of why trade has been affected harder than GDP is the composition effect. Trade 
flows are composed mainly of durable goods (about two thirds or more), while GDP consists mainly 
of services. Trade in goods was strongly impacted by the crisis while services showed some resilience 
to the crisis (Borchert and Mattoo, 2009). Lastly, there is an accounting bias, as GDP is measured as 
value-added and trade in gross values. 
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section gives a brief overview of the 
related literature. The next section identifies stylized facts on vertical integration and trade multipliers 
compiled from international input-output statistics. Section three extends the exploration of trade data 
patterns by estimating import multipliers for a larger selection of countries, regions and sectors. 
Section four develops a formal dynamic model incorporating short-run and long-term components. 
The last section concludes and provides the main policy implications of the analysis. 
 
 
I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
Trade in tasks and the fragmentation of production along global supply chains has challenged the 
validity of the traditional Ricardian models, based on the exchange of final goods, each country 
specializing in a certain type of products. Contrary to the Ricardian model, countries that are similar 
in factor endowment and technology have developed a significant part of their trade in the same 
products, and trade intermediate goods between their industries (Box 1). The new trade theory, by 
introducing imperfect competition, consumer preference for variety and economies of scale, looks at 
explaining divergence from this traditional model. 
 
An early appraisal of the extent of outsourcing can be found in Feenstra (1998) who compares several 
measures of outsourcing and argues that all have risen since the 1970s. Always on the descriptive 
side, Agnese and Ricart (2009) provide details on the extent of offshoring during 1995-2000 for 
several countries throughout the world and show that offshoring is not only a phenomenon among 
large developed economies. Besides, the authors provide evidence that offshoring is much more 
prominent in the manufacturing sector. 2 
 
An illustrative example of a globalized supply chain can be found in Linden et al. (2007), who study 
the case of Apple's iPod. Hanson et al. (2005) conduct a firm-level analysis with US multinationals 
and analyze the driving forces of inter-firm trade in intermediate inputs. Paul and Wooster (2008) 
study the financial characteristics of outsourcer firms in the US; they find that compared to non-
outsourcing firms the former have higher costs and lower profitability and have to perform in more 
competitive industries. Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008), who analyze a firm data set of the Belgian 
manufacturing sector, argue that firms that engage in offshoring activities improve their chances of 
survival in a globalizing industry. Nordås (2005) gives a review of vertical specialization and presents 
six country case studies, namely of Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, South Africa and the USA, 
analyzing production sharing in the automotive and the electronics industry. Sturgeon and Gereffi 
(2009) contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon from a business perspective, providing an 
overview of the micro-economic evidence and the role of outsourcing in industrial upgrading and 
competitiveness, while pointing-out some crucial data issues.   
 
On the conceptual side, the critic of the traditional Ricardian hypotheses and the development of new 
concepts have led to a vast literature (see Helpman, 2006 and WTO, 2008a for a review). We will 
focus on a few articles that have a direct relation to our analysis. 
 
                                                     
2 Although service offshoring has been rising significantly in recent years, it still accounts only for a 
small fraction of total offshoring; see OECD (2008) for an overview. 
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Box 1. Offshoring, outsourcing and the measure of vertical integration. 
 
The current crisis has important implications as the consequences are not only of an economic and 
financial nature. There is also a social impact as the reorganization of global supply chains implies the 
destruction and creation of jobs at different locations. During the 1990s, firms offshored and 
outsourced part of their production and built global supply chains, two phenomena that define 
globalization and are often mixed up. The relevant process when discussing global supply chains is 
offshoring, which comprises both offshore-outsourcing and foreign direct investments (FDI). 
Outsourcing to another domestic firm is not considered. Figure 1 gives an overview of the distinction 
between outsourcing and offshoring. 
Figure 1 Differentiation between Outsourcing and Offshoring 
 
 
 
 
The tendency to locate production stages in other countries was favored by several factors. First of all, 
overall trade costs have decreased in the last decades, i.e. not only tariffs have fallen, but also 
transport and communications costs as well as the time cost of transport (Jacks et al., 2008). A second 
important factor has been that through better infrastructure and logistic services, the reliability and 
timeliness of delivery has improved significantly (Hummels et al. 2001; Nordås et al., 2006). Finally, 
technological improvements, i.e. advances in IT, made it possible to separate geographically an 
increasing number of services tasks (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990). 
This fragmentation of the supply chain can be measured using three different methods. Some authors 
use firm surveys to account for the fragmentation of the value chain, others use foreign trade statistics 
and look, for example, at the share of parts and components in trade flows as an indicator for 
increased international production-sharing. A third possibility is offered by international input-output-
tables, that relate the output of one industry to the inputs of other industries, accounting for different 
countries, giving information on how each industry depends on  other industries, both as customer and 
as supplier of intermediate inputs. For example, Hummels et al. (2001) calculate the extent of vertical 
specialization, i.e. the share of imported inputs in total exports used for industrial production. 
One short-coming, however, of international input-output tables is that the data quality could often be 
improved and that they are not available on a yearly basis. They are nonetheless a powerful tool for 
measuring the size of production linkages and tracking the international transmission of demand and 
supply shocks. 
 
 
Hummels et al. (2001) compute vertical specialization using input-output tables for 10 OECD 
countries and 4 emerging market economies and find that it increased by 30% between 1970 and 
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1990.3 Yi (2003) builds on these findings and proposes a dynamic Ricardian trade model of vertical 
specialization that can explain the bulk of the growth of trade. 
 
A stock-taking of offshore outsourcing and the way it is perceived by economists and non-economists 
is made in Mankiw and Swagel (2006). A straightforward introduction to the economics of 
offshoring, the underlying motivations and effects is given in Smith (2006). Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) present a model of offshoring where the production process is represented as a 
continuum of tasks. The authors, thus, focus on tradable tasks rather than on trade of finished goods, 
i.e. during the production process, different countries participate in global supply chains by adding 
value. Yet another model of offshoring is proposed by Harms et al. (2009) who allow for variations of 
the cost saving potential along the production chain and consider transportation costs for unfinished 
goods. Within this framework they can explain large changes in offshoring activities with small 
variations of the parameters of their model. The link between the offshoring literature and the research 
on firm heterogeneity is established in Mitra and Ranjan (2008). They construct an offshoring model 
with firm heterogeneity and externalities and study the effects of temporary shocks on offshoring 
activities.  
 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) develop a model to study outsourcing decisions focusing on equilibria 
where some firms outsource in the home country and others abroad. In an earlier paper (Grossman 
and Helpman, 2002) the authors propose a general equilibrium model of the "make-or-buy-decision", 
i.e. the decision between insourcing and outsourcing. A model that allows firms to choose between 
vertical integration and outsourcing, as well as between locating the production at home or in the low-
wage South is proposed by Antràs and Helpman (2004). They point out that the more productive firms 
source inputs in low-cost countries whereas less productive firms in the high-cost countries of the 
North. Besides, if both types of firms acquire inputs in the same country, the former insource and the 
latter outsource.  
 
An explanation for the steady increase in outsourcing activities is offered by Şener and Zhao (2009), 
who analyze the globalization process by setting up a dynamic model of trade with endogenous 
innovation, where a local-sourcing-targeted and an outsourcing-targeted R&D race take place at the 
same time. The latter represents the so called "iPod cycle" where firms combine innovation activity 
with simultaneous outsourcing, a form of R&D strategy which becomes more and more important. 
Ornelas and Turner (2008) propose another model that explains the current trend towards foreign 
outsourcing and intra-firm trade. That the motivation for outsourcing can also be strategic rather than 
cost-motivated is shown by Chen et al. (2004). They model strategic outsourcing as a response to 
trade liberalization in the intermediate-product market. 
 
Of particular relevance for the present analysis, various papers help to understand the volatility linked 
to globalized activities. Du et al. (2009) elaborate a model on bi-sourcing, i.e. simultaneous 
outsourcing and insourcing for the same set of inputs, a strategy that is more and more often adopted 
by multinational enterprises. The use of this strategy, with the inherent options of preferring either the 
external or the internal source of intermediate inputs, may explain part of the reduction of trade flows 
in times of economic crisis.  
 
A model of in-house competition, i.e. between the different facilities of a multiplant firm, is 
introduced by Kerschbamer and Tournas (2003). Their model shows that in downturns firms may 
decide to produce in the establishment that has higher costs even when it would also be possible to 
locate production to the lower cost facility. The stability of supply chain networks is studied in 
Ostrovsky (2008), who proposes a model of matching in supply chains. The author deduces the 
sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks which, however, rely on the assumptions of 
the model of same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity. Bergin et al. (2009) analyze 
empirically the volatility of the Mexican export-processing industry compared to their US 
                                                     
3 An update for 2005 and 40 countries is provided in Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009). An alternative 
methodology based on international I/O tables can be found in Inomata (2008). 
 - 5 - 
counterparts with a difference-in-difference approach; they find that, on average, the fluctuations in 
value added in the Mexican outsourcing industries are twice as high as in the US. In addition, the 
authors propose a theoretical model of outsourcing that can explain this stylized fact.  
 
Box 2. Trade Elasticities. 
 
Elasticities measure the responsiveness of demand or supply to changes in income, prices, or other 
variables. Two prominent representatives of elasticities are the income elasticity and the price 
elasticity of demand. While the former measures the percentage change in the quantity demanded 
resulting from a one-percent increase in income, the latter measures the percentage change in the 
quantity demanded resulting from a change of one percent in its price.  
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with E = elasticity, Q = quantity demanded, P = price, and I = income. 
In consumer theory, price elasticity is complemented by elasticity of substitution between competing 
goods and services, leading to the concept of indifference curves. In this paper we will focus on the 
macro-economic income elasticities of trade, in short, trade elasticities.  
It is important to remember that in most of the literature reviewed in this paper, neither price effects 
nor substitutions effects are explicitly taken into consideration in this context. Thus, the trade 
elasticities are reflecting the pure effect of a change in domestic income (measured by GDP) to the 
quantity of imports. It is also the convention that we will adopt in the rest of the paper. 
The variation in the relative price of exports and imports is, nonetheless, implicitly taken into 
consideration in the calculation of the domestic product. Because GDP, on the demand side, is equal 
to the sum of consumption, investment and the net balance between exports minus imports (X-M), 
any changes in the terms of trade that affect (X-M) will be reflected, ceteris paribus, into the  
domestic product. The terms of trade effect is immediate when GDP is computed at current prices; it 
is formally imputed by national accounts when  elaborated at constant prices.  
 
 
Finally, Tanaka (2009) and Yi (2009), among others, explain the collapse of trade during the current 
world wide crisis as a systematic over-shooting due to the globalization of supply chains. However, 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009), using a multi-region/multi-sector CGE model, reject this hypothesis. 
Freund (2009) analyzes the effect of a global downturn on trade with a historical perspective. She 
finds that the elasticity of trade to GDP (see Box 2) has increased significantly in the last 50 years and 
that in times of crisis trade is even more responsive to GDP. McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) point out 
that the distinction between durable and non durable goods is fundamental to explain the overreaction 
of trade to the contraction of GDP in the current crisis. Borchert and Mattoo (2009) emphasize that 
services trade is much less affected in the crisis than goods trade. They argue that this can probably be 
explained by lower demand cyclicality and less dependence on external finance. Escaith and Gonguet 
(2009) study the transmission of financial shocks by international supply chains and propose an 
indicator of supply-driven shocks. A series of studies in Inomata and Uchida (2009) look at the 
various dimensions (trade, employment, finance) of the global crisis in the Asian Pacific region. 
 
 
II. STYLIZED FACTS AND TRADE MULTIPLIERS FROM AN INPUT-OUTPUT 
PERSPECTIVE 
As mentioned in the introduction, trade reacted very strongly to the first signals of recession in 2008 
(Figure 2). The sectors most affected were fuels and minerals, due to a strong price effect, and 
machinery and transport equipment because of a strong demand effect (Table 1). Indeed, consumer 
 - 6 - 
durable and capital goods were on the front line, as demand for these products relies on credit, which 
dried-up as banks closed their loan windows and flocked to liquidity. In turn, the lower industrial 
activity reversed brutally the trend in the prices of key primary commodities, which had been rising 
substantively since 2003.  
The speed and simultaneity of the 2008-2009 crisis is unprecedented, and indicates that there might 
have been a mutation in the way economic pandemic spread across the world. In previous instances of 
global turmoil, the transmission of shocks was mainly of macroeconomic nature: A recession in a 
foreign economy reduced demand for exports, which in turn depressed the activity in the home 
country. This traditional vision is compatible with the Ricardian approach of international economy, 
when countries exchange finished products (consumer or investment goods) and are therefore 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the level of their trading partners' final demand.   
Figure 2  World merchandise exports and GDP, 1960-2009  
(Real annual percentage change) 
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Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics and 2009 forecasts. 
 
Table 1:  Quarterly growth of world manufactures exports by product, Q1/08-Q3/09 
(percentage change over previous quarter, current dollar values) 
Quarter/Sectors  Q1/08 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 
Manufactures -1 9 -2 -15 -21 8 9 
Office and telecom equipment -13 5 5 -10 -27 13 14 
Automotive products 1 6 -14 -18 -33 15 12 
Iron and steel 10 23 7 -34 -32 -7 10 
Ores and other minerals 10 21 4 -33 -35 12 25 
Source: WTO. 
Global supply chains introduce new micro-economic dimensions that run parallel to the traditional 
macroeconomic mechanism of shock transmission, explaining in large part the magnifying effect of 
the crisis on international trade. Some of the mechanisms are purely of accounting nature: while GDP 
is computed on a net basis, exports and imports are registered on their gross value. In addition, 
because supply chains cover various countries, a lot of double counting takes place while goods for 
processing cross the borders at each step of the production process.  
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But the core of the explanation is to be found in the economic implications of the structural changes 
that affected world production since the late 1980s. In the contemporaneous context, adverse external 
shocks affect firms not only through their sales of finished goods (the final demand of national 
accounts), but also through fluctuations in the supply and demand of intermediate inputs. It has 
therefore been tempting to attribute the large trade-GDP elasticity, close to 5 in 2009, to the leverage 
effect induced by this geographical fragmentation of production.  
 
• Vertical integration and trade magnifier 
In the following section, we focus on the USA and Asia, a sub-set that epitomizes the vertical 
integration phenomenon from both a micro and macro perspective. The investigation, based on 
observed data, relies on national accounts and statistics on inter-sectoral trade in inputs produced by 
IDE-Jetro for various benchmark years.4 The information is presented as a set of interlinked input-
output tables to form an estimate of the composition of intermediate and final flows of goods and 
services between home and foreign countries. The calculation of a "Leontief inverse matrix" derived 
from these IO matrices is used to estimate the resulting effect of the series of direct and indirect 
effects on all domestic sectors of activity. This procedure allows to estimate the imported content of 
exports and to measure the vertical integration of productive sectors. 
As seen in Table 2, the observations on the USA and Asia, one of the most dynamic trade compact in 
the recent history of international trade, tend to support the "magnifying hypothesis". While exports of 
final products (consumer and investment goods) increased 7% in annual average over the 1990-2008 
period, exports of inputs (intermediate consumption, in the national account terminology) raised by 
more than 10% per year. In the same time, imports of such intermediate goods increased by 9%.5  
Table 2:  Asia and the USA: Annual growth of intermediate inputs and exports, 1990-2008 
Exports 
 
Total Imported 
intermediates Intermediate inputs Final goods and  services Total 
Agriculture          9.5 3.5 13.0 5.9 
Mining quarrying 15.6 7.6 ... 7.9 
Manufacturing 9.0 10.7 6.6 9.1 
Total sectors 9.1 10.2 7.1 9.1 
Note: Sum of China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taipei, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the USA 
in nominal values in US dollar; Total sectors include services and other sectors; 2008 estimates. Imports and 
exports include exchanges with the rest of the world. 
Source: Authors calculation, based on IDE-Jetro Asian Input-Output matrices. 
 
Because intermediate goods include commodities, in particular fuels, and are valuated at nominal 
prices, imports of intermediate goods show the highest growth rate for mining and quarrying. But 
manufacturing is the sector where exports of intermediate products increased most since 1990, 
comforting the hypothesis that vertical integration and trade in intermediate goods drove international 
trade in the recent past, and explained the trade collapse after September 2008.     
Retrospectively, there is a clear signal that export-led growth among developing economies has been 
associated with higher reliance on imported inputs. To mention a recent study on production sharing 
and the value added content of trade (Johnson and Noguera, 2009), countries systematically shift 
towards manufacturing exports, which have lower value added content on average, as they grow 
richer and this depresses the aggregate value added to export ratio per unit value.6 These authors show 
                                                     
4 We used the 7 sectors aggregation for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2008 matrices. The data for 2008 are 
estimates, other years are derived from national accounts and countries' official statistics. For a presentation and 
evaluation, see IDE-Jetro (2006), Oosterhaven, Stelder and Inomata (2007), and Inomata and Uchida (2009).  
5 Differences between imports and exports are due to the rest of the world (ROW). Within an 
international IO, trade is symmetric (bilateral exports should equal bilateral imports). 
6 Obviously, this strategy of diversifying into manufacture allows the developing countries to increase 
labour productivity and generate more income per capita. Thus richer countries are not defined by the intensity 
of the creation of value added, but by its extension. 
 - 8 - 
that the largest exporters among developed countries (Germany and USA) see their value added 
content scaled down due to a more integrated production structure with their respective regional 
partners (NAFTA for the US, and EU for Germany).  
These findings support the claim that supply chains and the fragmentation of manufacture production 
explain the over-shooting of trade elasticity during the crisis (Tanaka, 2009; Yi, 2009). Other experts, 
nevertheless, contest the hypothesis that higher demand elasticity behind the Great Trade Collapse 
could have been caused by vertical integration (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2009) because it affects only the 
relative volume of trade in relation to GDP (levels), while elasticity should remain constant in a 
general equilibrium context. 
The data compiled from national accounts data on Asian economies and the USA since 1990 (Table 
3) confirms the positive relationship between export orientation (share of export over total output) and 
reliance on imported inputs. Figure 3 shows that the relationship is rather stable over time between 
1990 and 2000, at least on manufactured products where it is stronger than for other product groups. 7 
Table 3 indicates also that all the Asian economies increased their exposure to exports during the 
1990-2008 period while the USA registered a slight reduction, especially before 2000.  
The ratio of imported inputs in relation to total exports (all sectors together) is stable for most 
economies (aggregated results for column 3 –growth rate of imported inputs / growth rate of exports– 
are close to 1). The exceptions are the USA and Japan where elasticity is about 1.7 percentage points 
(i.e., an increase in 1 percentage point of exports necessitates a 1.7% increase in imported inputs). 
Considering the size of these economies, this would indicate that the increase in the weight of 
intermediate goods in world trade is the result of the change in business models in developed 
economies, rather than due to the emergence of developing countries. Moreover, the latter may both 
result and explain the former, as the recent industrialization phase of developing countries is closely 
linked to the outsourcing strategy of transnational corporations (Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2009).    
                                                     
7 The data for 2008 tend to indicate a reduction in the reliance on imported inputs. Yet, because the 
2008 data are based on estimates rather than official national account statistics, this result should be taken with 
care. 
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Figure 3:  Manufacture sector: Ratio Exported output/Total Production (vertical axis); Imported inputs/Intermediate inputs (horizontal axis), percent 
Note: Based on national input-output tables, converted to USD using commercial exchange rates: 2008, preliminary estimates.  
Source: Authors' calculations, based on IDE-Jetro data base. 
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Table 3:  Asia and USA: Changes in exports and imported inputs elasticity, 1990-2008 
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 Variation (%): YoY PoP YoY YoY PoP YoY YoY PoP YoY YoY PoP YoY 
Country: Sector\Period: 1990-2008p 1990-1995 1995-2000  2000-2008p 
China Agriculture 7.5 -0.6 1.4 3.6 -0.4 3.5 9.1 0.2 ... 8.9 -0.4 2.3
 Mining quarrying 6.0 -6.8 4.1 2.2 -4.4 14.9 0.9 -1.8 36.8 11.9 -0.6 1.2
 Manufacturing 20.7 6.5 0.9 26.1 1.8 0.9 15.8 1.7 0.7 20.5 2.9 0.9
 Total sectors 20.1 3.7 0.9 27.3 1.5 0.9 14.3 0.7 0.9 19.5 1.6 0.9
Indonesia Agriculture 15.3 3.3 1.0 15.8 0.4 0.3 9.1 2.3 2.9 19.1 0.6 0.8
 Mining quarrying 7.4 -17.6 3.1 1.4 -8.7 4.5 4.5 1.6 4.9 13.3 -10.5 2.7
 Manufacturing 9.7 -2.3 0.9 18.2 -0.7 0.9 6.4 7.9 ... 6.7 -9.4 1.6
 Total sectors 8.8 -1.9 1.1 10.5 -2.4 1.4 5.3 5.7 0.2 10.1 -5.1 1.2
Japan Agriculture 7.2 0.4 0.8 5.9 0.0 0.7 2.3 0.1 1.2 11.3 0.4 0.8
 Mining quarrying 5.7 1.6 1.0 6.8 0.1 ... -1.5 0.3 ... 9.7 1.2 2.2
 Manufacturing 5.1 6.1 0.9 10.9 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 3.8 4.5 3.6 1.4
 Total sectors 5.4 2.0 1.0 11.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.5 4.6 1.4 1.7
Malaysia Agriculture 0.1 -16.3 ... -12.0 -13.9 ... -1.3 -1.9 3.6 9.4 -0.6 1.5
 Mining quarrying 9.3 -5.7 1.7 -2.6 -5.0 0.9 6.3 -11.7 5.9 19.6 11.1 0.9
 Manufacturing 13.6 13.5 0.9 29.1 9.3 1.0 7.0 7.5 1.1 8.9 -3.4 0.7
 Total sectors 11.7 5.4 1.1 20.1 2.8 1.4 7.4 5.1 1.1 9.5 -2.5 0.6
Thailand Agriculture 16.0 15.8 0.6 1.2 -1.4 11.3 -4.2 -0.1 1.7 42.4 17.2 0.5
 Mining quarrying 8.0 2.7 1.2 -15.5 -14.1 ... 8.0 1.4 ... 25.9 15.5 1.4
 Manufacturing 11.8 10.8 0.7 22.7 4.5 0.7 5.1 7.4 0.3 9.7 -1.0 0.8
 Total sectors 12.1 8.7 0.7 20.9 2.0 0.8 5.3 4.7 ... 11.2 1.9 0.8
USA Agriculture 4.6 1.7 2.1 5.0 0.7 2.0 -6.1 -1.5 ... 11.8 2.6 1.2
 Mining quarrying 2.1 -0.4 7.2 -3.1 -0.2 ... -4.5 -0.4 ... 10.0 0.3 1.7
 Manufacturing 5.1 0.2 1.5 12.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 -0.5 9.3 3.6 -0.3 1.8
 Total sectors 5.0 -0.1 1.7 10.8 0.2 0.9 0.6 -0.3 ... 4.3 0.0 1.7
Note: Nominal values in national currencies, converted in US dollars using average IMF exchange rate. YoY: 
Average annual changes; PoP accumulated variation from initial to final year, in percentage points. Exports 
include final goods and intermediate consumption; intermediate inputs include oil and other commodities. Total 
sectors includes other industries and services. 2008p: preliminary estimates. Results should be interpreted with 
caution, as variations in exchange rates can greatly affect the comparison between benchmark years. 
Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of IDE-Jetro Asian Input-Output matrices.  
 
 
• Vertical integration and trade elasticity 
The previous results relate to the imported content of exports, a level variable, and do not have direct 
implication with the debate on the stability of the Trade/GDP elasticity. Table 4 goes further and 
looks into the weight of imported inputs in sectoral value added (and in GDP). Contrary to some pre-
conceived ideas about export led growth, emerging countries are not only reprocessing goods for 
exports, but do also incorporate a sizable domestic content in their exports. While the share of 
domestic value added in total inputs (including factorial costs) for manufacture is still lower for 
developing economies, compared with developed economies, the gap is closing for China.  
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Table 4:  Share of Value Added and imported inputs, 1990-2008 (percentage)  
  VA/Total production costs  Imported inputs/VA 
Country: Sector\Period: 1990 2008 1990 2008 
China Agriculture 64.3 77.6 2.9 2.3 
 Mining quarrying 46.2 77.1 1.6 4.6 
 Manufacturing 28.2 32.2 24.9 37.3 
 Total sectors 40.1 46.4 11.2 18.1 
Indonesia Agriculture 80.8 64.7 1.4 4.6 
 Mining quarrying 80.3 67.0 1.3 11.4 
 Manufacturing 33.2 30.5 44.3 32.3 
 Total sectors 55.1 44.6 13.9 16.0 
Japan Agriculture 57.0 60.0 2.6 6.6 
 Mining quarrying 48.6 45.0 3.3 10.5 
 Manufacturing 34.0 35.5 18.5 32.8 
 Total sectors 50.2 55.2 7.5 12.1 
Malaysia Agriculture 69.3 66.8 10.9 15.4 
 Mining quarrying 80.8 50.8 5.2 22.4 
 Manufacturing 30.2 24.7 78.7 131.2 
 Total sectors 47.3 41.4 31.6 51.4 
Thailand Agriculture 66.2 53.3 8.4 18.4 
 Mining quarrying 72.3 82.5 4.0 5.0 
 Manufacturing 32.1 27.9 81.4 98.3 
 Total sectors 47.5 45.0 32.0 39.6 
USA Agriculture 34.4 34.2 4.7 16.0 
 Mining quarrying 75.1 55.3 3.5 28.2 
 Manufacturing 39.9 36.2 17.1 30.9 
 Total sectors 54.3 54.0 5.6 9.2 
Note: Total sectors includes other sectors, in particular services. Total production costs include factorial inputs  
(labour and capital)  and taxes, as measured by total value added (VA). 
Source: Authors' calculation, on the basis of IDE-Jetro data. 
 
More importantly for the purpose of the present study on trade and GDP elasticity, the weight of 
imported inputs in sectoral value added (and in GDP) has been increasing from 1990 to 2008 in all 
countries. The rate of increase is above 60%, except in Indonesia and Thailand (16% and 24%, 
respectively). The change is particularly significant when considering the manufacturing sector of the 
two developed economies, Japan and the USA, where the participation of imported inputs in total 
production costs has raised by an average of 80% between 1990 and 2008. With imported inputs 
contributing to more than 30% of their production costs in manufactures, these two industrialized 
countries are not far from the two largest developing countries of the table: China (37%) or Indonesia 
(32%).  
Finally, the intensity of the inter-industry linkages varies greatly from sector to sector. The reliance on 
imported inputs is consistently larger in manufacture than in other productive sectors, and also larger 
in smaller countries. At the extreme, the value of imported inputs may be more than industry's value 
added, as is the case of manufacture in Malaysia. 
The four building blocs that were identified above are central for explaining the specificities of the 
2008-2009 great trade collapse, with trade in some industries falling by more than 30% in two 
consecutive quarters (see Table 1 again). When industrial production is spread across various 
countries, and all segments of the chain are critical to the other ones (supplied constrained networks), 
a shock affecting one segment of the chain will reverberate through all the network. At the difference 
of the traditional macro-economic transmission of shocks, impacts are moving forward, from supplier 
to clients, and not backward as in the traditional demand-driven Leontief model (from client to 
suppliers). The intensity of the supply shock will vary according to the affected industry; if the origin 
of the shock is a systemic credit crunch, it will affect disproportionally the international segments of 
the global supply chains, through increased risk aversion and shrinking trade finance (Escaith and 
Gonguet, 2009).  
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The following equations formalize these empirical observations from a demand-oriented input-output 
perspective.8 In absence of structural changes affecting production function (i.e., when technical 
coefficients, as described by an input-output matrix, are constant), the relationship linking demand for 
intermediate inputs with an external shock can be described by the following linear relationship: 
ΔmIC = u' . M°. (I-A)-1 . ΔD              Eq. 1 
Where, in the case of a single country with "s" sectors: 9 
ΔmIC : variation in total imported inputs (scalar) 
u': summation vector (1 x s) 
M°: diagonal matrix of intermediate import coefficients (s x s) 
(I-A)-1  : Leontief inverse, where A is the matrix of fixed technical coefficients (s x s)  
ΔD : initial shock  on final demand (s x 1) 10 
Similarly, changes in total production caused by the demand shock (including the intermediate inputs 
required to produce the final goods) is obtained from: 
ΔQ = A . ΔQ + ΔD      Eq. 2 
Solving for ΔQ yields the traditional result: 
ΔQ = (I-A)-1 . ΔD      Eq. 3 
Aggregating impacts across all sectors "s", the total additional output derived from this demand shock 
is equal to: 
Δq = u' . ΔQ       Eq. 4 
The comparison between equations 1 and 4 is illustrative. Since [M°. (I-A)-1] is a linear combination 
of fixed coefficients, the ratio (ΔmIC / Δq) is a constant, and trade elasticity is 1. This results is 
consistent with the critics advanced by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) against the hypothesis of the large 
trade multiplier observed during the crisis being attributed to supply chains and vertical integration.11  
 
• Trade elasticity and the composition effect 
The “steady-state approach” imbedded in structural input-output relationships tells only part of the 
story.12 We should remember that the initial shock ΔD is not a scalar, but a vector (s x 1). The 
individual shocks affecting each particular sector do not need to be always in the same proportion 
from one year to another one. We already saw on the Asian-USA case that the reliance on imported 
                                                     
8 Analysing the supply-shocks from the quantity space would pose a series of methodological issues 
(Escaith and Gonguet, 2009). Notation uses macroeconomic practices and differs from usual IO conventions.  
9 The model can be extended easily to the case of "n" countries by modifying accordingly the matrix A, 
extending the IO relationship to include inter-sectoral international transactions of intermediate goods,  and 
adapting the summation vector "u".  
10 In this traditional IO framework considering one country and the rest of the world, exports of 
intermediate goods are considered as being part of the final demand. The situation differs when extending the IO 
relationship to include international transactions of intermediate consumptions, as in equation 1.  
11 Using a slightly different approach, the authors conclude that “the growth rate of imports of domestic 
goods is the same as that of domestic GDP. ... When the trend of globalization is correctly accounted for, the 
income elasticity of imports is generally close to unity.” (page 15).  Exploring the potential impact of the 2008-
2009 downturn using a CGE model, using appropriate benchmarks for trade and GDP, the authors do not find 
any multiplier effect on trade. 
12 “Steady-state” is used here in a loose sense of structurally stable dynamics; we are aware that the 
coexistence of such a Walrasian concept with the Keyenesian model of Leontief is particularly un-natural.  
Despite the conceptual contradiction, it is better suited to the CGE approach used by most contemporaneous 
trade analysts. 
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inputs is sector specific. As the sectoral import requirements [M°s] differ from sector to sector, then 
the apparent import elasticity for the national economy will change according to the sectoral 
distribution of the shock. 13 
It was in particular the case after the financial crisis of September 2008, as demand for consumer 
durable and investment goods (consumer electronics, automobile and transport equipment, office 
equipment and computers, etc.) was particularly affected by the sudden stop in bank credits. Because 
these sectors are also vertically integrated, the impact on international trade in intermediate and final 
goods was high. Table 5 shows that the coefficient of imported inputs, derived from equation [1] are 
much larger than in other sectors, for example agriculture or services.   
 
Table 5: Asia and USA: imported inputs coefficients, 2008.  
Sector/ Country  China  Indonesia Japan Malaysia Thailand USA 
Agriculture 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.09 
Mining quarrying 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.10 
Manufacturing 0.24 0.25 0.14 0.71 0.50 0.17 
Services 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.04 
Total sectors 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.60 0.42 0.12 
Note: Normalized imported inputs requirements (ΔmIC / Δd). Total sectors includes other sectors. 
Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of IDE-Jetro Asian Input-Output matrices. 
 
Services sectors, which are the main contributors to GDP in developed countries and also the less 
dependent on imported inputs, were more resilient to the financial crisis than manufacture. But 
services and other non-tradable sector will eventually be affected by the external shock.  
Because the initial shock was concentrated on manufacture and other tradable goods, the most 
vertically integrated sectors, the apparent Trade-GDP elasticity soared to approximately 5 (Figure 4). 
In a second phase, the initial shock reverberates through the rest of the economy, transforming the 
global financial crisis into a great recession. GDP continues to slow down but the decrease in trade 
tends to decelerate as the import content of services sectors (its sectoral imported input-VA ratio, as 
shown before in Table 4) is much lower than for manufacturing sectors.  
After the initial overshooting of trade, it is therefore normal to expect a regression to normality of the 
trade elasticity for 2010. Or, to use the language of an econometrician, the data generation process 
should follow an error correction model (ECM). This hypothesis will be tested in Section IV. 
Nevertheless, as we also shall see in this essay (Section III) this does not mean that observed trade 
multipliers should be constant in the long run, as in the steady-case situation.  
                                                     
13 The more complex the production process, the more potential gains in outsourcing part of it; thus it is 
natural to expect much more vertical integration in the manufacturing sector. Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009) 
show that manufacturing sectors in OECD countries generally use more imported inputs than other industrial 
and services sectors. It is specially the case for final consumer goods like ‘motor vehicles’ and ‘radio, TV and 
communication equipments’, or computers. Services are, as expected, less vertically integrated into the world 
economy. But even these activities show an upward trend in the use of imported services inputs (e.g. business 
services). 
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Figure 4:  World Production and GDP response, 1980-2009 (percentage growth and elasticity) 
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Notes: Five year rolling periods, constant prices. Production includes agriculture, mining and manufactures. 
Source: Based on WTO International Trade Statistics data base. 
 
Indeed, the structural changes that were deep enough to flatten the planet, as proclaimed by Tom 
Friedman, were also probably strong enough to shift the parameters governing CGE models. Thus, 
shifting trade multipliers may indeed exist in the long run, and reflect the move from one “steady-
state” to another one (Hicks would have used the word “traverse” for this transition path towards a 
new growth regime). According to the stylized facts that were identified using the Asian-USA 
compact, the long run transition should also vary from country to country, depending on its stage of 
industrial development and its export specialization. This heterogeneity will be more systematically 
explored in section III.  
 
•  Inventory effects 
Besides these structural effects, recent changes in the apparent trade elasticity are also probably linked 
to inventories as mentioned by various analysts (Baldwin, 2009, Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2009, among 
others), as retailers run-down their stocks in reaction to a large drop in final demand. Here again, this 
traditional macro-economic effect on inventories is amplified on the micro-economic side by the new 
business model that surged in the late 1980s and opened the way to international vertical integration. 
Even under the "just-in-time" management (production-to-order) favoured by global supply chain 
managers, geographically fragmented networks need to maintain a minimum level of inventories 
(buffer stocks) in order to face the usual risks attached to international transportation. While large 
players try to keep their inventories at the lowest possible level considering their sales plans and the 
acceptable level of risk, they tend in the same time to force their suppliers to maintain large stocks 
(production-to-stock) in order to be able to supply them quickly upon request. In addition, some up-
stream suppliers, engaged in highly capitalistic processes such as foundries, need to process large 
batches in order to benefit from economies of scale and lower their unit costs.   
As a result, there is always a significant level of inventories in a global supply chain, translating into a 
higher demand for banking loans (Escaith and Gonguet, 2009). When a drop in final demand reduces 
the activity of down-stream firms, or/and when they face a credit crunch, their first reaction is to run 
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down their inventories. Thus, a slow-down in activity transforms itself into a complete stand-still for 
the supplying firms that are located up-stream.  
These amplified fluctuations in ordering and inventory levels result in what is known as "bullwhip 
effect" in the management of production-distribution systems (Stadtler, 2008). This effect is more 
sensitive in an international setting. Alessandria et al. (2009) provide direct evidence that participants 
in international trade face more severe inventory management problems. Importing firms have 
inventory ratios that are roughly twice those of firms that only purchase materials domestically, and 
the typical international order tends to be about 50 percent larger and half as frequent as the typical 
domestic one. The related international trade flows, at the micro-economic level, are therefore lumpy 
and infrequent. As long as the down-stream inventories of imported goods have not been reduced to 
their new optimum level, foreign suppliers are facing a sudden stop in their activity and must reduce 
their labour force or keep them idle. 
The timing and intensity of the international transmission of supply shocks may differ from traditional 
demand shocks applying on final goods. For example, the supply-side transmission index proposed by 
Escaith and Gonguet (2009) implicitly assumes that all secondary effects captured by the IO matrix 
occur simultaneously, while these effects may actually propagate more or less quickly depending on 
the length of the production chain. Also, there might be contractual pre-commitments for the order of 
parts and material that manufacturers have to place well in advance in order to secure just-in-time 
delivery in accordance to their production plans (Uchida and Inomata, 2009).   
Nevertheless, in closely integrated networks, these mitigating effects are probably reduced, especially 
when the initial shock is large. A sudden stop in final demand is expected to reverberate quickly 
thorough the supply chain, as firms run-down their inventories in order to adjust to persistent changes 
in their market. This inventory effect magnifies demand shocks and is principally to blame for the 
initial collapse of trade in manufacture that characterized the world economy from September 2008 to 
June 2009. A study on the electronic equipment sector during the crisis (Dvorak, 2009) indicates that 
a fall in consumer purchase of 8% reverberated into a 10% drop in shipments of the final good and a 
20% reduction in shipments of the related intermediate inputs (e.g., computer chips and other parts). 
The velocity of the cuts was much faster than in previous slumps, as reordering is now done on a 
weekly basis, instead of the monthly or quarterly schedules that prevailed up to the early 2000s.  
 
 
III. GLOBAL, SECTORAL AND REGIONAL TRADE ELASTICITY PATTERNS  
The preceding sections provided information on the diversity of country/sectoral situation in an 
epitome (the USA-Asian compact), using accounting relationships. In this section, we extend the data 
analysis to the rest of the world, in order to identify patterns illustrative of the GDP elasticity of 
imports and the putative role of supply chains. We start by extracting stylized facts at world level 
using a set of standard regressions, then analyzing how the parameters of interest vary according to 
specific groupings of observations, or change with time. It should be noted that the results presented 
in this section are exploratory, and do not pretend to provide a strong statistical basis for confirmatory 
inferences or predictions. For this purpose, more formal dynamic specifications will be presented in 
the last section of this paper. 
The data supporting the exploration are obtained from the IMF's World Economic Outlook 2009. 
World GDP weighted at market exchange rates 14 is constructed by combining World GDP at 2000 
prices from the WDI database (World Bank) with GDP growth rates (market exchange rate) from the 
WEO2009 (IMF). Our sample comprises annual data between 1980 and 2009.  
 
 
                                                     
14 World GDP is usually weighted with PPP, which, however, is inadequate when investigating demand 
on international markets (i.e. GDP-trade elasticity). 
 - 16 - 
• Global patterns 
 
The GDP elasticity of imports aggregated at world level is estimated in a first step by OLS: 
ttt ym εβα ++=     Eq. 5 
with tm  = logarithmized imports, ty  = logarithmized GDP and tε  = residuals.  
We obtain an elasticity of 2.28 for the full sample (R²= 0.99 for 30 observations).  
As a robustness check and to provide a benchmark for subsequent calculations, we estimate a state 
space object containing GDP and imports, to which we apply a Kalman Filter, with maximum 
likelihood: 
Signal: ttttt ym εβα ++=    Eq. 6 
State: ttt νββ += −1     Eq. 7 
The estimated elasticity is also 2.28. 
 
 
To explore and validate the likelihood of 
the hypothesis of global supply chains 
having led to an increase of the GDP 
elasticity of imports — transition from one 
steady state (without global supply chains) 
to another one (with global supply chains 
— we should observe changing elasticities 
patterns over time and across the sample.  
To visualize the changing characteristics 
over time, we redo the estimations both 
with OLS and Kalman Filter for rolling 
time windows of each 10 years, i.e. the 
estimation sample subsequently changes 
by one year, the first sample comprising 
1980 – 1989, the second 1981 – 1990 and 
so forth. Results are displayed graphically 
in Figure 5.  
Each data point of the graph reflects the 
estimated coefficient for the previous 10 
years, e.g. the displayed value in the year 
2000 reflects the GDP elasticity of imports 
computed for the 10-year window between 
1991 and 2000. Both graphs show clearly, 
that the GDP elasticity of imports is not at 
all constant and changes over the years.  
The graphs feature quite closely the trend 
that should be expected if the hypothesis 
of the impact of global supply chains on 
trade elasticities and a traverse from one 
steady state to another one were correct. 
From 1989 to 1998, we can observe a 
steady increase in the elasticity from about 
1.6 to 3.0, which in the following six years 
decreases again.  
Figure 5 GDP Elasticity of Imports – World  
(constant prices) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. Data description see text. 
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Between 2004 and 2008 a stabilization at a level of about 2.3 has taken place, before a predicted 
decrease in the crisis year 2009. Thus, the observed data patterns seem to strengthen the hypothesis 
that trade elasticity has increased in the years of rising globalization in the 1990s and turned back to a 
new steady state that has been reached around 2004. 
But even if these results seem to support the hypothesis of a structural change in world trade – 
compatible with the role of supply chains in explaining the increased elasticity of imports to GDP – it 
should be pointed out that the conducted analysis does not give any information on the causes of the 
observed change. Therefore, we continue the explorative data analysis by looking at sub-groups of 
countries. If the global supply chains were the cause for the observed change in elasticities, the results 
should be similar for countries participating heavily in global supply chains and a different trend 
should be observed in the rest of countries. 
 
• Exploring country patterns 
 
The objective of the section is to explore in more details the data generation process and identify 
possible clusters of countries. We conduct the following analysis with the group of the 50 most 
important exporters15 as listed in WTO (2008b, p.12 Table I.8). For the analysis, we use data from the 
IMF's World Economic Outlook 200916, namely imports of goods (volume) and gross domestic 
product (in constant prices) in a sample from 1980 to 2009. In order to address the trade-off between 
number of observations and disaggregation, we take advantage of the panel dimension of our data and 
cluster the countries in an appropriate way.17  
As a first approach to defining groups among countries, we cluster them according to observed data 
patterns. For this purpose, we estimate the elasticity of imports to GDP using a state space object for 
each individual country and apply a Kalman Filter for three different samples: 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 
and 2000-2008. The results provide a first idea of how the elasticity of imports is evolving for each 
country in the sample. Then, we construct up to 9 different clusters (3 x 3) 18 with the following logic:  
- Does the elasticity from sample one to sample three increase, remain stable or decrease (3 options)?   
- If so, does the elasticity of the second sample lay above, in between or beneath the two other 
elasticities (another 3 possible cases)?   
 
                                                     
15 Chinese Taipei is excluded due to data availability. Thus, we analyze the remaining 49 countries of 
the group of the 50 leading exporters in world merchandise trade in 2007, namely Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Viet Nam.  
16 From 1980 - 1991 data for GDP and imports for Russia and the Ukraine are missing in WEO2009. 
These missing values are replaced with the corresponding values from WEO2008. As all GDP values of Russia 
in WEO2009 were multiplied with 1.1362 (in comparison to the WEO2008) the added values were also 
multiplied with the same factor. 
17 It is important to point out that contrary to the world aggregate, where countries are weighted by 
their GDP; all countries have the same weight in the following clusters. Thus, comparison with the results of 
Figure 5 is somehow biased. 
18 Actual number of cluster (see Tables 8 and 9 in Annex) is smaller as no country pertains to clusters 
4, 5 or 6, which have in common that the elasticity from sample one to sample three remains stable. Cluster 9 
(decrease, with the second elasticity beneath the first and the third elasticity) is omitted, as only one country 
falls in this category. 
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Figure 6:  GDP Elasticity of Imports – Clusters based on elasticity patterns 
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Note: Constant prices. Country groupings are based on the combined changes in trade elasticity in the three 
1980-1990, 1990-2000. 2000-2008 (see text and Table 9) 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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We arrive at the following country groups (see Table 9 in the appendix). Cluster 1: countries with an 
increasing elasticity over the full sample, which overshoots in the middle of the sample; cluster 2: 
countries with an increasing elasticity over the full sample; cluster 3: countries with an increasing 
elasticity over the full sample, but with a drop in the middle of the sample; cluster 7: countries with a 
decreasing elasticity over the full sample, but with an increase in the middle of the sample; and cluster 
8: countries with a decreasing elasticity over the full sample. The results of the panel OLS estimation 
with fixed cross-section effects and rolling windows of 5 years are displayed in Figure 6. 
As the data show, only the first cluster of countries features a trend compatible with our hypothesis of 
global supply chains being the cause for the change in elasticities. If this cluster contained all the 
countries that participate in global supply chains, the before mentioned hypothesis would be 
enormously strengthened. Table 9 in the appendix shows that many of the participants of global 
supply chains are actually in the cluster. However, many others which are known for their 
participation in global supply chains, like Germany, China or Mexico, are missing, which suggest that 
it might be just coincidence that some of the countries show the data structure that confirms the above 
mentioned hypothesis. 
Overall, given these findings, we rather tend not to accept the hypothesis that global supply chains 
explain all by themselves the changes in trade-income elasticity. However, this does not imply that the 
emergence of global production networks since the late 1980s did not play a role, only that other 
factors may also be at work to explain the results observed when estimating equations 5 to 7.   
 
• Clustering by export specialization 
 
As the clustering by pure elasticity patterns cannot confirm the hypothesis of global supply chains 
being the driving force behind the change in the GDP elasticity of imports, we cluster the countries in 
an alternative way, based on some economic rational. We will group all those countries together, that 
have the same export specialization. Main export activities are given by UNCTAD in its table 
"Country trade structure by product group" (UNCTAD, 2008, Table 3.1). Thus, we obtain the 
following five clusters (details are given in Table 9 in the appendix): fuel exporters; ores, metals, 
precious stones and non-monetary gold exporters; manufactured goods exporters; machinery and 
transport equipment exporters; and other manufactured goods exporters.19 Results of panel OLS 
estimations with fixed cross-section effects and rolling windows of 5 years are displayed graphically 
in Figure 7..  
Again, the patterns of the calculated elasticities change significantly among the different clusters of 
countries. The elasticity of the group of fuel exporters increases steadily, which however is certainly a 
terms-of-trade effect and has nothing to do with the globalization of supply chains. For the 
manufacturing sector, both for the aggregate (manufacturing exporters) and for the two subgroups 
(machinery exporters and other manufactured goods exporters) there have been three peaks in trade 
elasticity, the first one in 1990, the second in 1998, and the third in 2005. 
Each time, elasticity has decreased in between. This however, does not support the hypothesis of an 
impact of supply chains on the elasticity either. Thus, we still do not find supporting evidence for the 
implication of the globalized supply chains in the changes of trade elasticities.20  
 
 
 
                                                     
19 The following three product groups were not considered in the analysis, as they comprise less than 
three countries: all food items; agricultural raw materials; chemical products. 
20 Yet another way of clustering the countries by export specialization, using the main export products 
of each country, does not change the result qualitatively either: the hypothesis of an impact of the global supply 
chains on the changes in GDP elasticity of imports can still not be confirmed by our explorative data analysis. 
The results of this robustness check can be found in the appendix in Figure 10 and Figure 11.  
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Figure 7:  GDP Elasticity of Imports – Cluster based on export specialization 
 
Note: Constant prices. See text and Tables 8 and 9 for methodology and groupings 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
• Clustering by regions 
 
To complete the exploration of trade elasticity patterns, we cluster the countries by (geographical) 
regions. Within one regional cluster the countries often dispose of a similar endowment and may, 
accordingly, have assumed a similar role in the world economy.  For example, the literature often  
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Figure 8:  GDP Elasticity of Imports - Regions 
Note: Constant prices. See text and Table 9 for methodology and groupings. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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refers to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) or Emerging Asia as one entity when 
discussing offshoring. Therefore, we construct the following set of clusters: Latin America, Emerging 
Asia, New EU-Member States, Middle East, G7-Countries, and Western European Countries (see 
Table 9 in the appendix). Results of the panel OLS estimation with fixed cross-section effects for 
rolling windows of five years of the GDP elasticity of imports are displayed graphically in Figure 8.  
As can be observed, elasticities vary substantially between the different regions but, overall, there is 
no evidence for a strengthening of the supply-chain hypothesis. The evolution of the elasticity of the 
New EU-Member countries could be an illustration of a transition that has taken place, but at the same 
time the graph for the countries of the Middle East clearly allude to the limitations of the trade 
elasticity approach: the exploration of the data patterns does not say anything about the causes of the 
change in elasticity. In the case of the latter group of countries, the increase in elasticity most 
probably is due to changes in relative prices and is not related at all to the globalization of supply 
chains.  
To sum up, even ignoring the known limitations of the model, we cannot find strong evidence for the 
role of global supply chains for the changes in the GDP elasticity of imports. Although on the 
aggregated world level trade elasticity is changing in a way that one could be tempted to interpret like 
confirming evidence (trade elasticity increased in the years of rising globalization in the 1990s, then 
fall back to lower level in the mid-2000s), the disaggregated analysis does not support this hypothesis. 
Some countries that are part of global supply chains do not show significant differences in the 
evolution of their elasticities, while countries less integrated in global production networks tend to do 
so. Trade elasticities are in general quite volatile, but the exploration of elasticity patterns does not 
support the hypothesis that deeper vertical integration is "the" driving force behind this development. 
There are probably more causal factors at work. We mentioned the changes in relative prices which 
inflated the value of primary commodities. Other factors among others could include the lowering of 
trade barriers after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995, or the increasing taste of consumers 
for diversity as their income increased. 
 
IV. AN ESTIMATION WITH THE ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
The previous sections were exploratory and no formal assumption was made on the kind of 
relationship existing between imports and GDP. We now assume that there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the growth of trade and the growth of GDP, i.e. the elasticity is stable in the 
long-run. As described in the introduction and evidenced in the above mentioned Figure 5, we expect 
the elasticity of trade to GDP to have increased during the 1990s because of outsourcing and 
offshoring but to have decreased afterwards, once a new steady state had been reached. The elasticity 
that we measure through trade and GDP data is a short-run elasticity that reflects both the long-run 
equilibrium and the stochastic fluctuations leading to volatility, such as those illustrated in section II 
(sequential nature of sectoral shocks, inventory effects, etc.).  
We use an Error Correction Model (ECM) to account for this and to estimate the steady-state 
elasticity. We work with quarterly data from the OECD National Accounts database over the period 
1961-200921 in order to have a consistent dataset with time-series for the OECD area (based on 24 
OECD economies) and individual data for 30 OECD countries. The data, in constant prices, allow to 
control for the changes in relative price, one of the source of fluctuations identified in the previous 
sections.  
 
                                                     
21 Year-on-year change, volumes in USD (fixed PPPs, OECD reference year), seasonally adjusted. 
Market exchange rates are used for the OECD aggregation. 
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• Steady-state elasticity  
 
We start with a very simple proportional relationship between trade and GDP: tt YQM = , where tM  
are imports (in volume), tY  is real GDP and Q  the share of imports in GDP. In log form, the equation 
can be written: tt yqm +=  with m , q  and y  the natural logs of the previous variables. Adding the 
lagged values of both trade ( 1−tm ) and GDP ( 1−ty ), as well as stochastic fluctuations ( tu ), the model 
can be written: 
ttttt uyymm ++++= −− 121110 ββαα     Eq. 8 
Assuming that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between M and Y, and that m* and y* are 
the equilibrium values of m and y, we have: 
**** 2110 yymm ββαα +++=     Eq. 9 
At the equilibrium, we set ut equal to zero and the above equation implies that:  
*
11
*
1
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1
0 ym α
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α
α
−
++−=       Eq. 10 
This equation is consistent with tt yqm +=  if we have 
1
0
1 α
α
−=q  and 11 1
21 =−
+
α
ββ
. This is the long-
run equilibrium relationship between trade and GDP. We can interpret 
1
21
1 α
ββγ −
+=  as the long-run 
equilibrium trade elasticity. 
We can then model a divergence from equilibrium in the presence of stochastic shocks. Taking the 
first difference of tm  adding and subtracting both 11 −tyβ  and 11 )1( −− tyα  from the right hand side, 
the model can be rewritten as: 
tttttt uyyymm +−+++Δ+−−+=Δ −−− 112111110 )1())(1( αβββαα     Eq. 11 
The coefficients 1β  and 2β indicate the short-run impact of a change in GDP on imports. )1( 1 −α  is 
the speed at which trade adjusts to the discrepancy between trade and GDP in the previous period. 
This is the error correction rate. 
The above equation is the classic specification of an “Error Correction Model” (ECM). Before 
proceeding to its estimation, we check for the degree of integration. Running Phillips-Perron unit root 
tests, we can see that m  and y  have unit roots but we reject the assumption that mΔ  and yΔ  contain 
unit roots22. A Johansen test further shows that the rank of cointegration of m  and y  is one23. This 
justifies the use of the above specification.  
We can estimate the model in the following way: 
ttttt yymm εδδδα ++Δ++=Δ −− 132110     Eq. 12 
                                                     
22 See  Table 11 in the Annex. 
23 See  Table 11 in the Annex. 
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The latter equation is similar to the former one with 1211 ,1 βδαδ =−=  and 213 ββδ += . The 
advantage of the specification is that we can derive directly the long-run equilibrium trade elasticity 
from the estimated coefficients: 
1
3
1
21
1 δ
δ
α
ββγ =−
+= . Furthermore, 1δ  is the speed at which imports 
adjust to trade and 2δ  is the short-term impact of GDP on trade (short-term elasticity). 
First, the regression is run on aggregate data for 24 OECD economies (1971-2009). Results are 
presented in Table 6 below.  
Table 6:  Estimation of the Error Correction Model and long-run trade elasticity (24 OECD countries) 
  Time period 
  1971-2009 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Dependent variable: Δmt           
            
mt-1 -0.021* -0.122 -0.162* -0.212*** 0.006 
  (0.012) (0.108) (0.088) (0.076) (0.139) 
Δyt 2.533*** 2.046*** 1.436*** 1.819*** 3.228*** 
  (0.263) (0.613) (0.299) (0.508) (0.289) 
yt-1 0.052** 0.184 0.320** 0.592*** -0.012 
  (0.024) (0.142) (0.158) (0.202) (0.318) 
            
Number of observations 153 35 40 40 38 
R-squared 0.63 0.53 0.60 0.55 0.83 
            
Long-run trade elasticity 
(δ3/δ1) 
2.43 1.51 1.98 2.79 1.90 
            
Note: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
Over the period 1971-2009, all the variables of the model are significant and the model explains 63% 
of the variance in the data. We find strong coefficients (both in terms of statistical and economic 
significance) for the short-term adjustment of trade to GDP changes ( tyΔ ) in all periods. The speed at 
which imports converge to their equilibrium value is generally less significant and the coefficient is 
relatively small. 
Of special relevance to our present concern, the last row of Table 6 reports the implied long-run trade 
elasticity ( ). Its overall value of 2.43 over the 1971-2009 period is slightly higher than the elasticity 
measured in the previous section (2.28) but remains close despite a different statistical model and 
different data. As hypothesized, the trade elasticity has increased up to the 1990s and appears to have 
decreased afterwards. However, in the last regression for the 2000s, the computed value for lags of 
imports and GDP are not significant; therefore some caution should be exercised when interpreting 
these results, despite the relative good fit to the data.  
It is nonetheless very interesting to see that the long-term elasticity, according to this model, is almost 
the same in the 1980s and 2000s. This result would confirm that vertical specialization, as suggested 
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by theory, has no reason to increase the equilibrium elasticity of trade to GDP and that the 1990s, with 
their higher trade elasticity, can be interpreted as a transition period to a new "steady-state". 24 
 
• Variation across countries  
 
To examine discrepancies across countries and relate those possible differences to vertical integration, 
Table 7 below reports the results of similar regressions at the country level.  
Table 7:  Estimation of the Error Correction Model at the country level 
  Estimation - Dependent variable: Δmt Long-run trade elasticity 
Country 
Period 
mt-1 Δyt yt-1 All years 1990s 2000s 
Australia 1961q2-2009q2 -0.049* 0.757** 0.087* 1.77 2.15 2.85 
Austria 1961q2-2009q3 -0.139*** 1.888*** 0.266*** 1.91     
Belgium 1961q2-2009q3 -0.066** 1.597*** 0.120** 1.82 2.40 1.84 
Canada 1961q2-2009q3 -0.046** 1.809*** 0.081** 1.75   2.12 
Czech Republic 1995q2-2009q3 -0.038 1.190** 0.067     2.06 
Denmark 1961q2-2009q2 -0.025 1.273*** 0.045   2.23 3.82 
Finland 1961q2-2009q3 -0.164*** 1.990*** 0.271*** 1.65 1.73 2.06 
France 1961q2-2009q3 -0.038** 2.124*** 0.081** 2.13 2.98   
Germany 1961q2-2009q3 -0.029 0.802*** 0.06       
Greece 1961q2-2009q3 -0.050** 3.136*** 0.110** 2.22 3.25   
Hungary 1995q2-2009q2 -0.094* 2.868*** 0.252       
Ireland 1961q2-2009q2 -0.019 0.485** 0.028     0.89 
Italy 1961q2-2009q2 -0.052** 1.406*** 0.092** 1.78 3.17 2.67 
Japan 1961q2-2009q3 -0.037** 1.165*** 0.055** 1.50   2.47 
Korea 1970q2-2009q3 -0.132** 2.029*** 0.205** 1.56 1.83 2.06 
Luxembourg 1961q2-2009q2 -0.079*** 0.208 0.108*** 1.37   1.64 
Mexico 1961q2-2009q2 -0.021 2.653*** 0.060**   3.65 2.34 
Netherlands 1961q2-2009q3 -0.033 0.383*** 0.054   2.42 2.16 
New Zealand 1961q2-2009q2 -0.116*** 0.753*** 0.200*** 1.73 1.97 1.91 
Norway 1961q2-2009q3 -0.076*** 0.435 0.071** 0.93 1.33 2.62 
Poland 1995q2-2009q3 -0.256** 3.474*** 0.510** 1.99   1.75 
Portugal 1961q2-2009q3 -0.02 0.960*** 0.038   2.62 3.66 
Slovak Rep. 1993q2-2009q3 -0.061 0.793* 0.076       
Spain 1961q2-2009q3 0.004 -0.273 -0.036   3.73 2.21 
Sweden 1961q2-2009q3 -0.148*** 0.868*** 0.266*** 1.79   1.86 
Switzerland 1961q2-2009q3 -0.02 1.081*** 0.045     1.84 
Turkey 1961q2-2009q2 -0.054* 2.199*** 0.109* 2.03 2.68 1.74 
United Kingdom 1961q2-2009q3 -0.188*** 1.343*** 0.385*** 2.05 2.56   
United States 1961q2-2009q3 -0.077*** 1.695*** 0.154*** 1.99 2.72   
Note: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The multiplier is not 
reported when the coefficients used to calculate it are not significant. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Generally, the model works quite well in explaining the variations across the growth rate of trade and 
GDP. There are however some countries for which coefficients are not significant and the trade 
elasticity is not calculated. All countries demonstrate an increase in their trade elasticity until 1990. 
Afterwards, countries differ in the evolution of the elasticity between the 1990s and 2000s. In 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Korea, Norway and Portugal, the trade elasticity continues to increase 
after 2000. In the case of Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and Turkey, there is a 
                                                     
24 As mentioned, we use "steady-state" in the very limited sense of "long term outcome"; the trade 
patterns which emerged in the 2000s witnessed the accumulation of large macroeconomic imbalances and was 
not sustainable.   
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decrease in the elasticity as seen with the aggregate data in Table 6. For other countries, the results are 
not significant enough to assess the trend. 
 
• Trade response to external shocks 
On Figure 9 is represented the "Impulse Response Function" (IRF) of imports when there is an 
exogenous shock on GDP (calculated on the basis of the estimation of the OECD time-series for 
1999-2009). When there is a 1% decrease in GDP, we can see that during the first year following the 
shock trade decreases more than proportionally and “over-reacts” (there is a 3% decrease in imports). 
Then, there is a convergence towards a new equilibrium value. Trade recovers during the second and 
third years; 4 years after the shock the decrease in trade is about 2%, in line with the multiplier 
observed in Table 6 (1.9). 
Figure 9:   Impulse Response Function (IRF)   
Impact of an exogenous decrease in GDP on trade (24 OECD countries) 
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Note: Orthogonalized IRF based on the estimation of the OECD model for the period 1999-2009. 
 
 
 
• Role of vertical specialization  
 
In order to check more precisely for the influence of international supply chains in the change in trade 
elasticity, we change the model and introduce a vertical specialization variable. 25  
                                                     
25 Cheung and Guichard (2009) suggest that the way vertical specialisation affects trade is by raising its 
elasticity with respect to income. 
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The estimated equation becomes: 
tttttt VSyVSyymm εδδδδδα ++++Δ++=Δ −−− 514132110 *   Eq. 13 
where VS is the country vertical specialization share, calculated as in Hummels et al. (2001)26. VS is 
closely related to the imported content of intermediate goods derived previously from equation [1] in 
an input-output context.  
The vertical specialization variables slightly increase the goodness-of-fit of the model for most 
countries but are not always significant. To see to what extent vertical specialization can help to 
explain the trade collapse during the crisis, we do a forecasting exercise. For each quarter, we predict 
the value of imports based on the estimated model. We then compare the results between the first 
model (without vertical specialization) and the second model (with vertical specialization). As it can 
be seen in Table 12 in the Annex, the discrepancy between the predicted change in trade and the 
observed trade collapse is only marginally reduced when using the specification with vertical 
specialization. The difference in percentage points tends to be lower for most countries but not in a 
way that has significantly increased the ability of the model to predict the trade collapse, even if 
vertical specialization has shaped the dynamics of transmission. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The paper investigates the role of global supply chains in explaining the trade collapse of 2008-2009, 
in line with the long-term rise observed in trade elasticity since the 1980s. After reviewing the 
literature, the study adopts an empirical strategy based on two complementary steps. Stylized facts are 
first derived from (i) the observation of interrelated input-output matrices for a demonstrative sub-set 
of countries (Asia and the USA), and (ii) from the use of exploratory analysis on a large and 
diversified sample of countries, of different income and development levels, regions and resource 
endowments.  
 
The results obtained from this exploratory phase highlight that import elasticities have been in general 
very volatile and suggest the specification of a statistical ECM model to measure the respective short-
term and long-term dynamics of trade elasticity. An ECM model is therefore used in a third phase, to 
formally probe the role of vertical integration in explaining changes in trade elasticity. 
 
Aggregated results obtained using both exploratory and ECM models tend to support the hypothesis 
that long-term trade elasticity has raised during the 1990s, before lowering in the late 2000s. The 
concept of steady state equilibrium implies, however, that vertical integration should only affect the 
level of trade relative to GDP but not the elasticity. While we expect the trade elasticity to be stable in 
the long-run, we also recognize that the pattern observed from the data is compatible with a structural 
change from one steady state (a "Ricardian" economy where countries trade final goods) to another 
one (a "trade in tasks" economy, where countries trade also intermediate goods in a global supply 
chain). Accordingly, from the late 1980s onwards, the internationalization of production has caused a 
shift from one steady state to a new one with trade elasticities rising only during the transition phase, 
coming back then to their long-run equilibrium level, at a new steady state where trade represents a 
higher share of GDP.   
 
                                                     
26 Data come from Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009). Time-series have been created over the period 
1995-2009 with 3 data points (1995, 2000 and 2005 for most countries). Because data are interpolated and 
extrapolated, there is no guarantee that the variable accurately reflects the variation over time of the vertical 
specialisation share. The assumption is that this share is relatively stable over years and that the trend suggested 
by the three data points is enough to account for its evolution. 
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In the short run, the paper shows that a shock affecting differently distinctive sectors of the economy 
could also have an transitory impact on the trade elasticity of the whole economy, explaining some of 
the volatility observed in the data. Moreover, two supply-chain related factors are at work to explain 
the overshooting of trade elasticity that occurred during the 2008-2009 trade collapse. The first one is 
the composition effect, as the initial demand shocks linked to the credit crunch concentrated 
disproportionably on consumer durables and investment goods, the most vertically integrated 
industrial sectors; the second one is the "bullwhip effect" where inventory adjustments are amplified 
as one moves upstream in the supply chain. But the disturbance is expected to dissipate and the 
elasticity to return to its long-run value. 
 
As our ECM results show, this pattern can be observed for the import multiplier calculated for the 
world aggregate. On the other hand, while the aggregate results did provide ground for the shifting-
steady state hypothesis, disaggregated analysis could not confirm the generality of the hypothesis. 
Indeed, a more detailed analysis showed  significant differences among trade elasticities for different 
countries and sectors. The direct observation of intra-sectoral trade, using input-output models, as 
well as standard time-series econometrics tends to identify the aggregate pattern in many countries, 
including Japan and the USA. However, others which are also known for their participation in global 
supply chains, like Germany, China or Mexico, are not showing the expected long-term increase in 
trade elasticity, suggesting that it might be just coincidence that some of the countries show the data 
structure that confirms the above mentioned hypothesis. Moreover, when a more formal specification 
is used, and vertical specialization is explicitly included as an explanatory variable, the results are 
again inconclusive. 
 
Overall, given these findings, we rather tend not to accept the hypothesis that global supply chains 
explain all by themselves the changes in trade-income elasticity. However, this does not imply  that 
the emergence of global production networks since the late 1980s did not play a role — our results 
clearly indicate that they did have a role — but only that other factors may also be at work to explain 
the diversity of the observed results. 
 
************* 
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V. APPENDIX 
 
Table 8 Overview of Clusters ordered by countries 
                                                      
  1 2 3 7 8 LA EA 
New 
EU ME G7 Europe fuels mining
manufac-
turing 
machines 
and 
transport 
equip. 
other 
manu-
factures metals coal petroleum gas medicine pc
commu-
nications
electro-
nics vehicles
Other 
trans-
port 
equip-
ment 
Algeria                x         x       x x       
Argentina               x x             x        
Australia             x           x    x x         
Austria              x             x x          x  
Belgium                x          x       x    x  
Brazil               x     x        x x  x          
Canada                  x      x    x x    x x     x  
Chile                 x    x       x    x          
China  x     x       x x       x x    
Czech 
Republic       x       x      x x      x x   x  
Denmark              x         x   x x    x  x      
Finland              x          x   x x        x    
France               x         x x   x x          x x 
Germany              x        x x   x x          x  
Great Britain    x      x x   x x    x  x  x  x  
Hong Kong    x   x       x x       x x x   
Hungary             x       x      x x       x x    
India                x      x       x  x   x        
Indonesia                  x     x  x  x  x x x       
Iran   x      x   x       x        
Ireland                  x      x   x       x x     
Israel                  x     x    x x x      x  x    
Italy                   x      x x   x  x         x  
Japan                x         x    x x         x x  
Korea                 x     x       x x    x    x x x x 
Kuwait                 x             x     x             x               
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  1 2 3 7 8 LA EA 
New 
EU ME G7 Europe fuels mining
manufac-
turing 
machines 
and 
transport 
equip. 
other 
manu-
factures metals coal petroleum gas medicine pc
commu-
nications
electro-
nics vehicles
Other 
trans-
port 
equip-
ment 
Malaysia              x     x       x x    x   x x x   
Mexico                   x x        x x    x    x  x  
Netherlands          x         x   x x    x   x     
Nigeria               x          x       x        
Norway                x         x x       x x       
Philippines             x    x       x x       x  x   
Poland               x       x      x x          x  
Portugal              x         x   x  x         x  
Russia                x          x       x x       
Saudi 
Arabia          x       x   x       x        
Singapore             x    x       x x    x   x x x   
Slovak 
Republic      x       x      x x    x    x  x  
South 
Africa         x            x x x   x       x  
Spain                    x      x   x x          x  
Sweden               x          x   x x      x  x  x  
Switzerland            x          x  x           
Thailand               x    x       x x       x  x   
Turkey               x              x  x           
Ukraine                x           x  x   x        
United Arab 
Emirates  x       x   x       x        
United 
States           x      x    x x         x  x 
Venezuela  x    x      x       x        
Viet 
Nam                x                       x   x     x               
                           
 
Note: The table provides information on the clustering of countries according to a series of characteristics, e.g. linked to their export specialization or the specific behavior of 
their trade elasticity.  
Description of the clusters: For the clusters 1,2,3,7 and 8 the countries were grouped together according to the consecutive patterns observed for the estimated elasticities of 
total imports to GDP through three sub-period: 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2008:  Cluster 1: countries with an increasing elasticity over the full sample, which 
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overshoots in the middle of the sample; cluster 2: countries with an increasing elasticity over the full sample; cluster 3: countries with an increasing elasticity over the full 
sample, but with a drop in the middle of the sample; cluster 7: countries with a decreasing elasticity over the full sample, but with an increase in the middle of the sample; and 
cluster 8: countries with a decreasing elasticity over the full sample (albeit the total number of possible clusters is 9, some of them were empty);  
LA = Latin America; EA = Emerging Asia; New EU = New Member Countries of the EU; ME = Middle East; G7 = G7-Countries; Europe = European Countries;  
fuels = fuels;  mining = ores, metals, precious stones and non-monetary gold; manufacturing = manufactured goods; machines and transport equip. = machinery and transport 
equipment; other manufactures = other manufactured goods; metals = metalliferous ores and metal scrap; coal = coal, coke and briquettes; petroleum = petroleum, petroleum 
products and related materials; gas = gas, natural and manufactured; medicine = medicinal and pharmaceutical products; pc = office machines and automatic data-processing 
machines; communications = telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment; electronics = electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof; vehicles = road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles); other transport equipment = other transport equipment. 
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Table 9:  Overview of Countries in each cluster 
Clusters by observed elasticity patterns 
Cluster 1 Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, India, 
Japan, Poland, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey 
Cluster 2 Australia, Chile, China, Denmark, Germany, Korea, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Viet Nam 
Cluster 3 Algeria, Iran, Singapore, Thailand, Ukraine 
Custer 7 Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, 
Philippines, Switzerland, USA 
Cluster 8 Argentina, Ireland, Mexico, Spain 
  
Clusters by export specialization 
Fuel exporters Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela 
Ores, metals, precious stones 
and non-monetary gold 
exporters 
Australia, Chile, Israel, South Africa 
Manufactured goods exporters Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, USA, Viet Nam 
Machinery and transport 
equipment exporters 
Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, 
Poland, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Thailand, USA 
Other manufactured goods 
exporters 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Viet Nam 
  
Clusters by export specialization (export product) 
Metalliferous ores and metal 
scrap exporters 
Australia, Brazil, Chile 
Coal, coke and briquettes 
exporters 
Australia, Indonesia, South Africa 
Petroleum, petroleum products 
and related materials exporters 
Algeria, Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Viet Nam 
Gas, natural and manufactured, 
exporters 
Algeria, Canada, Indonesia, Norway, Russia 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products exporters 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, 
Sweden 
Office machines and automatic 
data-processing machines 
exporters 
China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
Telecommunications and sound-
recording and reproducing 
apparatus and equipment 
exporters 
China, Finland, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Sweden 
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Electrical machinery, apparatus 
and appliances, n.e.s., and 
electrical parts thereof exporters 
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, USA 
Road vehicles (including air-
cushion vehicles) exporters 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden 
Other transport equipment 
exporters 
France, Korea, USA 
  
Clusters by region 
Latin America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela 
Emerging Asia China, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
New EU-Member States Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic 
Middle East Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
G7-Countries Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, USA 
Western European Countries Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
  
 
Note: The table provides information on the countries included in each cluster. 
Source: Classification based on authors' calculations and UNCTAD (2008). 
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Figure 10:  GDP Elasticity of Imports - Export Specialization (Main Product) (1) 
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Note: We construct country clusters with the help of the "Export structure by product" as compiled by 
UNCTAD (2008, Table 3.2D (year 2005-2006)). For each of our 49 countries all export products with a share 
among the country's exports of 5% or higher have been extracted (if no product exceeds 5% the most important 
product is taken). These export groups are classified on a SITC Rev.3 3-digit basis. Then, we constructed 
clusters of countries with the same export products on a 2-digit basis (in order to have clusters with a significant 
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number of countries); and made the analysis with those clusters that comprise at least three countries. The 
analysis was conducted with the following export-product-country groups: Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
exporters; coal, coke and briquettes exporters; petroleum, petroleum products and related materials exporters; 
gas, natural and manufactured, exporters; medicinal and pharmaceutical products exporters; office machines and 
automatic data-processing machines exporters; telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing 
apparatus and equipment exporters; electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts 
thereof exporters; road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) exporters; and other transport equipment 
exporters. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
 
Figure 11:  GDP Elasticity of Imports – Export Specialization (Main Product) (2) 
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Note: See Note to Figure 8. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Table 10:  Phillips-Perron unit root tests for the OECD variable used in the Error Correction Model 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
Variable 
Test 
statistic 
Z(t) 
1% 
critical 
value 
5% 
critical 
value 
10% 
critical 
value 
MacKinnon 
approximate 
p-value for 
Z(t) 
Result of the test 
(null hypothesis: the 
variable contains a 
unit root) 
Imports -1.385 -4.022 -3.443 -3.143 0.8651 Accepted (unit root) 
GDP -0.841 -4.022 -3.443 -3.443 0.9620 Accepted (unit root) 
First difference of imports -6.071 -3.492 -2.886 -2.576 0.0000 Rejected (no unit root) 
First difference of GDP -6.134 -3.492 -2.886 -2.576 0.0000 Rejected (no unit root) 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
 
Table 11:  Johansen tests for cointegration 
Maximum rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace statistic 
5% critical 
value 
0 6 1066.0458 . 19.2781 15.41 
1 9 1074.1781 0.10148 3.0135* 3.76 
2 10 1075.6849 0.01963     
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Table 12:  Predicted change in imports and observed values (estimates from the Error Correction Model) 
Model 1 - No VS variable Model 2 - With vertical specialisation 
Observed change in imports 
Predicted change Difference in percentage points Predicted change Difference in percentage points Country 
2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Australia -8.2% -7.9% 2.1% -2.1% 0.5% 2.0% -6.1 -8.5 0.1 -2.3% -0.5% 0.4% -5.9 -7.5 1.7 
Austria -4.2% -5.8% -2.4% -2.7% -5.4% -1.6% -1.5 -0.4 -0.8 -3.0% -5.6% -2.2% -1.3 -0.2 -0.2 
Belgium -8.6% -5.8% -1.2% -6.1% -3.9% 1.0% -2.6 -1.9 -2.2 -6.2% -3.9% 0.9% -2.4 -1.9 -2.0 
Canada -6.7% -12.5% -1.8% -5.0% -6.1% -1.4% -1.6 -6.3 -0.4 -4.7% -5.6% -0.1% -2.0 -6.8 -1.7 
Czech Republic -6.0% -8.3% -1.4% -0.2% -4.6% 1.0% -5.8 -3.7 -2.3 -0.4% -4.0% 4.3% -5.6 -4.3 -5.7 
Denmark -3.2% -8.2% -4.0% -3.9% -3.6% -4.7% 0.6 -4.7 0.7 -4.0% -3.7% -3.7% 0.8 -4.5 -0.3 
Finland -7.4% -18.7% -4.6% -11.3% -13.8% 1.0% 4.0 -4.9 -5.6 -10.5% -14.8% -2.2% 3.1 -3.9 -2.4 
France -3.3% -6.2% -2.7% -4.7% -4.4% 0.7% 1.4 -1.8 -3.4 -4.9% -5.1% -0.2% 1.5 -1.1 -2.4 
Germany -4.3% -5.8% -5.6% -2.9% -5.1% -0.3% -1.4 -0.7 -5.2 -3.1% -5.0% -0.2% -1.1 -0.8 -5.4 
Greece 2.3% -14.4% -2.9% -2.8% -2.6% -1.3% 5.1 -11.8 -1.6 -3.9% -5.4% -2.3% 6.3 -9.0 -0.6 
Hungary -9.1% -9.5% -2.2% -6.2% -7.9% -5.9% -2.9 -1.6 3.6 -6.2% -8.4% -6.3% -2.9 -1.1 4.1 
Ireland -4.5% -3.1% 1.0% -1.6% -0.4% 0.6% -2.9 -2.7 0.4 -3.0% -3.4% -3.1% -1.5 0.3 4.1 
Italy -5.9% -9.4% -3.1% -5.4% -7.2% -0.7% -0.5 -2.2 -2.3 -5.9% -7.9% -2.1% 0.0 -1.6 -1.0 
Japan -1.6% -16.2% -3.5% -5.7% -8.6% 1.5% 4.1 -7.6 -4.9 -6.1% -9.6% -0.2% 4.5 -6.7 -3.3 
Korea -15.3% -8.7% 8.4% -16.7% -0.8% 7.8% 1.4 -7.9 0.7 - - - - - - 
Luxembourg -8.9% -9.0% -0.8% -2.6% -0.5% 2.5% -6.3 -8.5 -3.3 -3.3% -0.7% 2.7% -5.6 -8.2 -3.5 
Mexico -12.7% -13.2% -6.2% -6.2% -15.7% -0.5% -6.5 2.5 -5.7 - - - - - - 
Netherlands -3.8% -5.6% -2.3% -1.9% -4.2% -1.1% -1.9 -1.4 -1.1 -2.0% -4.3% -1.2% -1.9 -1.3 -1.0 
New Zealand -7.0% -8.6% -3.8% -2.0% -0.3% 3.0% -5.0 -8.4 -6.9 -5.4% -4.3% -1.8% -1.6 -4.3 -2.0 
Norway -6.0% -8.1% 1.5% -1.1% -0.6% 0.4% -4.9 -7.5 1.0 -1.0% -0.3% 0.8% -5.0 -7.8 0.6 
Poland -7.9% -7.0% -6.1% -3.2% -0.4% 2.7% -4.7 -6.6 -8.9 -3.6% -0.7% 2.5% -4.3 -6.3 -8.6 
Portugal -6.7% -8.1% -2.2% -4.8% -4.9% 1.1% -1.8 -3.2 -3.3 -4.7% -4.6% 1.1% -2.0 -3.5 -3.3 
Slovak Republic -4.6% -15.5% -1.1% 0.1% -8.0% 0.7% -4.7 -7.5 -1.8 -0.2% -7.8% 1.9% -4.3 -7.7 -3.1 
Spain -6.5% -11.8% -2.4% -7.3% -9.3% -3.0% 0.8 -2.5 0.6 -7.5% -9.2% -2.3% 1.0 -2.5 -0.1 
Sweden -3.1% -12.8% -0.9% -5.8% -2.3% 0.9% 2.7 -10.5 -1.9 -5.8% -2.3% 1.0% 2.7 -10.5 -1.9 
Switzerland -4.6% -1.6% -4.2% -1.8% -2.0% -0.2% -2.8 0.4 -3.9 - - - - - - 
Turkey -18.7% -7.6% 3.1% -11.8% -7.4% 8.5% -6.8 -0.1 -5.4 -11.7% -7.3% 8.6% -6.9 -0.3 -5.6 
United Kingdom -5.6% -7.3% -2.2% -5.3% -7.2% -0.7% -0.3 -0.1 -1.5 -5.1% -7.0% -1.7% -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 
United States -4.6% -11.3% -4.0% -4.2% -4.8% -0.7% -0.4 -6.6 -3.3 -4.5% -6.0% -1.9% -0.1 -5.3 -2.1 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
